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Writing in the first volume of the Yale Law Journal in 1891,
Professor Baldwin referred to the vacillating policy which often
resulted from changing corporate managements as a "real evil,"
and the voting trust as the remedy to which there was then
increasingly frequent resort. The "evil" is as real now as then,
but resort is being had to another remedy, namely, the creation
of a fairly small class of voting shares along with larger classes
of non-voting shares. The utilization of this remedy, however,
although authorized for many years by the corporation statutes
of many states,' in certain prominent reorganizations, for the
purpose of vesting voting control in certain classes of stock
representing relatively small participations in the corporate
assets, has recently aroused considerable comment and interest.
Such voting shares are often called management stock. The
use of the word "management" is likely to be misleading, for
the holders of such stock normally have nothing to do with the
actual management of the corporation, but are vested solely
with the right to elect all or some of the directors$2 So far as
the provisions of the statutes themselves are concerned, the
holders of management stock are in substantially the same posi-
tion as the holders of stock of any other class in their relation
to the corporation and the other stockholders, subject to such
limitations as may be set out in the certificate of incorporation.
1 N. J. Laws 1926, c. 318, p. 533:
"Every corporation organized under this act shall have power to crcate
two or more kinds of stock, any of which may be stock with par value or
stock without par value, with full, limited or no voting powers of such
classes, with such .designations, preferences, relative, participating, optional
or other special rights, qualifications, limitations or restrictions thereof as
shall be stated and expressed in the certificate of incorporation "* "
N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) c. 60, § 51; Onio GEN. CODE (Page,
1926) §§ 8623-4, 8669; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) Art. 23, § 'S; DSL.
REv. CODE (1915) § 1927; MAss. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 150, § 14; VA. Gu;.
LAws (1923) § 3792; MACHEN, CoitRom'TONS (1908) § 570.
2Likewise, the term "management stock" is not to be confused with
"founders' or management or deferred shares" sometimes issued by English
companies, usually carrying a right to share in the surplus profits of the
company after the payment of fixed dividends on the other shares and
sometimes, though rarely, given special voting powers. PAMEr CO PANY
LAw (10th ed. 1916) 85-6, 347; PALMER, COMPANY PRECEDENTS (8th ed.
1902) 491-493, 693; GoRE-BROWN & JORDAN, H DmwY-BooK ON JOINT STOCK
COMPANmS (27th ed. 1907) 29.
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At least one writer,3 however, maintains that their position is
radically different, and that holders of management stock should
be subjected to certain responsibilities of a fiduciary character
toward the corporation and the other stockholders, viz.: (a)
so to arrange the capital structure of the corporation that no
class of stock shall appropriate to its benefit any of the capital
contribution made by any other class of stock; (b) to act dis-
interestedly, and to refrain from acting in any situation in
which the holders of management stock have an interest apart
from that of the corporation; and (c) to bear liability jointly
with the directors for corporate mismanagement unless they
shall dissent from the acts complained of. These three proposi-
tions are apparently advanced less as statements of legal prin-
ciples established by court decisions, or sanctioned by statute,
than as suggested rules which it is felt the courts should adopt
in order to guard against what are stated to be the dangers and
possible abuses attendant upon the situatioi created by an issue
of management stock.
This article is not concerned with the first of the above prop-
ositions; 4 but is limited to an inquiry into the soundness of the
second and third propositions. There can be no doubt that
courts of equity have jurisdiction to grant relief against abuses
of the power that rests in the hands of management stockholders.
But it is submitted that these rules, suggested as being necessary
to solve the problem, go far beyond the necessities of the fact
situation which is said to have arisen. Furthermore, they are
unjustified under sound principles of law and equity.
Certainly these rules involve novel and extremely onerous
responsibilities to be laid upon a stockholder. We start with
the fact that the management stockholder is the holder of stock,
3 Berle, Non-Voting Stock and "Bankers' Contero" (1926) 39 IIAYV. L.
R11v. 673.
4 The first proposition seems to be based upon a misconception of the
true fact situation. It is impossible for management stockholders as such
"to arrange the capital structure of the corporation." Any liability for
an improper arrangement of the capital structure must fall upon the
parties setting up the structure, not upon a class of stock forming part
of the structure so set up. This proposition is also considerably weak-
ened by the fact that the leading decision relied upon in its support (Ilodg-
man v. Atlantic Refining Company, 300 Fed. 590 (D. Del. 1924)) has since
been reversed. 13 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926). In that case the District
Court had set aside as fraudulent the sale of no par stock to stockholders,
in control of the management, for a price considerably less than that paid
by others, at the same time, for the same class of stock. The Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the lower court's decision on the
ground that the transaction complained of did not involve actual fraud.
If the Court of Appeals had felt that the relationship of the parties pur-
chasing the stock of itself constituted a constructive fraud, it would logi-
cally have affirmed the decision of the lower court.
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duly authorized by, and issued under, express statutory sanc-
tion. Why should such stock be placed in a special category,
and its holders subjected to disabilities more severe than those
imposed on any other stockholder, and even more severe than
those generally imposed on directors?
One of the reasons urged in answer to the above question
is the relatively small interest of the management stockholder
in the corporate assets. However, no basis for imposing these
responsibilities upon management stock by reason of its
relatively small interest in the corporate assets can be found
in the statutes.5 As far as the statutes are concerned, the rela-
tive interests in corporate assets, as well as the relative voting
rights, of the several classes of stock are left entirely as matters
of contract among the parties organizing the corporation, to be
provided for in the certificate of incorporation.
Management stock is usually held by representatives of invest-
ment bankers who have purchased bonds or other securities
from the corporation and distributed them to the public, or by
representatives of creditors who have aided the corporation
in time of financial stress. Such holders have real interests in
the welfare of the corporation, often greater than that of the
few minority stockholders frequently in control. They are in
fact usually the only possible representatives of the interests
of security holders other than the stockholders in the manage-
ment of the corporation. That such security holders have an
interest in the management of the corporation, there can be
no doubt, but it has been found impracticable to allow them
to vote individually in corporate matters. Today, the average
stockholder in the large corporation regards himself more as
a security holder than as in any sense a responsible managing
partner in the corporate enterprise, and the legal distinction
between bondholders and stockholders is fast becoming a dis-
tinction unwarranted by the actual situation. This has been
well brought out by Professor Isaacs 7 and is probably the
5 Szpra note 1.
6 See Masslich, Financing a New Corporate Entcrpripse (1910) 5 ILL.
L. REv. 70, 71. Referring to the "volume of small investors which the
continental countries of Europe afford," he states:
"These peasants, of course, give no thought whatever to the goodness
of the security, but rely entirely upon their bankers."
That this popular diffusion of corporate securities has now become prev-
alent in the United States, see the papers read before the Academy of
Political Science at its meeting in New York, March 9, 192., maling this
matter the special subject of consideration.
7 In the article of Isaacs, Business Secnrity and Legal SectrMy (1923)
37 HARv. L. REv. 201, 210, it is said:
"In legal theory the bondholder lends money to an enterprise in which
he is not a participant. Whatever interest in property or control is given
him is mere security for a loan. He is to be contrasted as sharply as
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reason for the popular indifference to the presence or absence
of voting rights of which Professor Ripley complains.8
Another argument advanced in favor of the imposition of
these responsibilities upon management stock is that new fact
situations have arisen. But is the fact situation of manage-
ment stock new? It will be admitted that control of corpora-
tions by a minority of the stock is no novelty, and that in the
past it has been maintained by various devices, notably voting
trusts. It will likewise be admitted that management stock
is but a new device for the same purpose, but it is argued that
it is, "on its face, subject to no limitation whatsoever." The
effect of this argument would seem to be that the only difference
between management stock and voting trusts is that "in the
latter case the legislatures have seen fit to impose certain limi-
tations against permanent divorce of voting rights, while in
the case of management stock, the legislatures have not.
These arguments against management stock are apparently
based on the feeling that the statutes in question are susceptible
of abuse, and in general contravene public policy. It is felt
that the law cannot be blind to the fact that investment bankers
may utilize such statutes for the creation of relatively small
classes of voting stock purposely to achieve control without
making any substantial investment. Though the writer whose
propositions are referred to above concedes the prevalence among
such bankers of a fairly high standard of business and banking
ethics, he thinks that "the law can hardly leave investors subject
to the doubtful protection of private consciences."Y To all such
arguments the same answer may be made that Justice Swaze
possible with a stockholder. He is not an investor, not an owner. Ho
is distinctly an outsider. At one time in the history of business such may
have been the true situation of the bondholder, but it is not today. lie
is distinctly an investor. The great investment bankers, when they take
up the problem of financing an enterprise, decide between financing through
bonds on the basis of a very technical study of the conditions before thorn,
but after they have made their decision, they sell the stocks or bonds
equally as investments to the public. The legal difference between stocks
and bonds play only an indirect and perhaps a minor part in the decision.
The investment banker's 'factor sheet' in such a problem would show more
prominently questions pertaining to the salability of the issues to inves-
tors. * * *
"In times of stress, the realities bireak through the legal fiction. The
securities, whatever part of law their forms were taken from, are found to
be in reality a mode of ownership-organization."
For similar comment see Spring, Upset Prices in Corporate Reorganiza-
tion (1919) 32 HARv. L. Rsv. 489.
8RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927) 78 et seq.
9 Supra note 3, at 676.
MANAGEMENT STOCKHOLDERS
made in Warrea v. Piz,1O' to similar arguments against the vali-
dity of voting trusts:
" * .*" many of the arguments urged in favor of the view
that voting trusts are contrary to public policy are argu-
ments which would very properly be addressed to the legis-
lature :-* * --: ."
The final deduction drawn by the above writer from certain
cases cited is that, "Ultimately they may be analyzed to a feel-
ing on the part of the Court that a group in control was act-
ing unconscionably towards persons who had no effective voice
in, and had not assented to, the corporate result." 11 With this
there can be little quarrel. But proceeding then to the question
whether the doctrine thus found "changes in any degree the
time-honored rule that majorities may not confiscate the prop-
erty of minorities in corporate matters," the writer there neces-
sarily finds that it does. Confiscation, however, was never the
extreme to which majority action would be allowed to go. The
rule of conduct which the courts have enforced against majority
stockholders has much more nearly proximated that truly time-
honored rule of property, "sic utcrc tito ut zon alienu11-n lJadw;
or, as stated by Morawetz:
"9 * :* the majority derive their powers from an implied
delegation of authority from the other shareholders, and are
bound to use their powers in good faith for the benefit of
the whole association." 12
How much greater, if greater at all, are the duties and dis-
abilities of management stockholders than those placed on ordi-
nary majority stockholders? That they are as great as those
imposed on a single majority stockholder or on voting trustees
may be conceded, but clearly they do not approach those of
directors, much less the extremes suggested in the propositions
here examined.
The often-stated disability of directors to deal with the cor-
poration arises largely from their technical relation to and
identity with the corporation, involving the technical rule of
agency that an agent may not deal with himself. The principles
applicable to dealings by a director with his corporation, as
stated by MIachen,13 may be summarized as follows: (1) a
director, acting as agent of the corporation, is under an absolute
disability to represent the corporation in any transaction in
10 66 N. J. Eq. 353, 411 (1904).
21 Supra note 3, at 681.
12 AMORAWETZ, CORPORATIONS (2d ed. ISS) § 477; and see also BLMcnE,
op cit. supra note 2, § 1306; 7 R. C. L. §§ 285-6.
13 MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1563.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
which he himself has an interest, except with the consent of
stockholders, and (2) in dealings between the corporation and
a director not as an agent, but as an individual, the director
must be able to prove the utmost good faith and fairness. When
there are a sufficient number of other agents or directors ade-
quately to represent the corporation, the majority rule is that
the technical disability first referred to disappears and the ques-
tion then becomes chiefly one of the fairness of the transaction
between the agent and his principal.14
As the corporation can act only through its officers and direc-
tors, directors should unquestionably be subjected to these tech-
nical rules. Holders of management stock, however, are clearly
not within such rules, because they are not vested with the
management of the corporation but only with the right to select
all or. some of those in whom such management is vested-
namely, the board of directors. To contend that management
stockholders in their dealings with the corporation are subject
to the same disabilities as directors is to ignore the fundamental
differences between the positions of management stockholders
and directors. The directors are the managing agents of the
corporation. They are elected by the stockholders to act as
agents for the corporation and, in performing the duties thus
delegated to them by the stockholders, they are properly held
to the responsibilities and disabilities incident to such agency.
Management stockholders, on the other hand, are in no sense
agents of the corporation. They do not and cannot manage
the affairs of the corporation. The statutes and charters which
provide for management stock provide also that the sole power
of management of the corporation shall be vested in the direc-
tors.15 If management stockholders are the agents of any one,
they are the agents of the other stockholders who have expressly
or impliedly' delegated to them the right to elect all or part of
the board of directors. Normally, the election of directors is
the sole function of management stock and the stock has no voice
in other corporate matters. It is logical and proper that manage-
ment stockholders be held to a high degree of faithfulness in
the exercise of their power to elect directors. No one can
quarrel with a rule of law that requires management stock-
14 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (1918) 3576; Howard v. Tatum, 81 W. Va.
561, 94 S. E. 965 (1918); Wabash Ry. v. Ia. & S. W. Ry., 200 Iowa 384,
202 N. W. 595 (1925); cf. also Ransome Concrete Machinery Co. v. Moody,
282 Fed. 29 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) (upholding contracts of employment of
two directors where the vote of each was necessary to the validity of
the other's contract); Citizens & Co. v. Oil Co., 191 Ky. 183, 229 S. W.
88 (1921) ; infra note 17.
i MORAWETZ, op. cit. supra note 12, § 475; N. J. Comop. STAT. (Cum.
Supp. 1924) c. 47, § 12; N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1923) c. 60, § 60; Oio
GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 8660.
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holders to use their power fairly to elect directors who in their
honest judgment are qualified properly to manage the affairs
of the corporation, nor with a rule that prohibits management
stockholders from exercising their power in their own interests,
or from putting dummies, incapable of independent judgment
and action, on the board.
But to go beyond this-to subject management stockholders
to technical disabilities and responsibilities imposed upon direc-
tors as agents of the corporation, although management stock-
holders are not in fact such agents, and cannot be such without
violating the one function, that of electing directors, imposed
upon them-is an extension of the fiduciary doctrine beyond
all limits justified by logic, reason or legal precedent. Of course,
if a management stockholder oversteps the boundary of his
proper function, rand becomes in fact a managing agent of the
corporation, either directly or through dummies on the board
who are controlled and dominated by him, he subjects himself
to the disabilities and responsibilities of a director; but, in the
absence of such a showing-and it should be borne in mind that
whether or not directors are dunmmies or are controlled or dom-
inated by management stockholders is always a question of fact,
and that they are not such merely because they were elected
by the management stockholders q---there is no justification for
a rule which would apply to him the technical disability of a
director and prohibit his dealing with the corporation.
In this connection a word may perhaps be inserted as to the
26 Int. Stevedoring Co. v. Frank Waterhouse & Co., 129 Wash. 451, 225
Pac. 420 (1924) ; see Cowell v. McMillin, infra note 20, at 42:
"It is insisted, however, that the directors were dummies when they
voted for the renewals, because they were elected by the vote of McMillin,
the holder of the majority of the shares of stock. This must be con-
sidered in connection with all other evidence. In the sense that they
owed their positions as members of the board to McMillin, complainant
is correct; but, in the sense that they were mere creatures, willing or
obligated to do McMillin's bidding, and to aid him in executing fraudulent
designs, or knowingly to do any act beyond the law, or that was unfair
or oppressive, or against the defendant company's interests, the conten-
tion is without merit. It is needless to do more than to state the ele-
mentary rule that the majority of the stockholders usually elect the direc-
tors, and that a corporation is represented by its directors, not by the
stockholders. So, it is to the directors of a company that the manage-
ment of its concerns and the power to make contracts are given. Nor
does the fact that a director only owns one share in a corporation ordin-
arily alter the general rule by lessening the power vested in him as a
director, the board of directors being expressly or implicdly authorized
to do all acts which are proper to carry out the corporation's chartered
purposes."
See also Levy v. Equitable Trust Co., 271 Fed. 49, 5G (C. C. A. Sth,
1921); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Port Lobos Petroleum Corp., 2S0 Fed. 994,
939 ( D. Del. 1922).
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likelihood of such control. The directors elected by the manage-
ment stockholders will undoubtedly for the most part be indi-
viduals well known to, possibly business associates of, the latter
-as a concession of considerable practical importance some
of the directors so elected may even represent opposing factions
or groups of the other stockholders-but a majority, if not all,
of the directors of a corporation large enough to have warranted
the creation of management stock will be men whom one would
hesitate to label ipso facto the dummies of another, merely by rea-
son of their election by that other. The result is that the indul-
gence of a presumption of control by the management stockhold-
ers without any proof of the fact would, in addition to being with-
out legal or logical foundation, often prove ridiculous in its appli-
cation.
Even if the management stockholder be regarded as the agent
of the other stockholders for the purpose of electing directors,
there is no rule of law which prevents him from dealing with
persons other than stockholders. And, as long as the corpora-
tion is managed by a board of directors who, though elected
by the management stockholders, are capable of independent
judgment and action, the corporation is a third person. The
courts will not disregard the fact that the corporation is a
separate entity from its stockholders until in a particular case
this well-established relationship is shown to be the means of
fraud or unfair dealings. These considerations are no more to
be thrown aside, and a reign of terror invoked by providing a
technical rule of disability in the case of the management stock-
holder, than in the case of a voting trustee, or of a single major-
ity stockholder, or of a few minority stockholders in control.
The present tendency of the courts is undoubtedly to relax
the rule imposing a technical disability, even in its application
to directors, and to hold the directors only to the test of good
faith and fair dealing if the corporation is represented by a
disinterested majority.1  But no decision has been found, even
in jurisdictions which impose upon directors an absolute dis-
ability to deal with the corporation, which imposes a similar
disability upon a stockholder, though the stockholder be a major-
ity stockholder, or in a position of dominance over the affairs
of the corporation. The maximum responsibility which the
courts have put upon stockholders in a position of dominance
has been that of good faith and fairness in their dealings with
17 MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 1572, 1573; MOAWETZ, op. cit. supra
note 12, § 521; FLEMCHER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 3595. See Rogers
Powers, Duties and Liabilities of Corporate Directors (1915) 12 Omo L.
REP. 619, 623, 629.
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the corporation, s a rule which disregards the fact of the cor-
porate entity and treats such stockholders as fiduciaries to a
limited extent, but which falls far short of prohibiting dealings
between such stockholders and the corporation. BMachen
approves of this requirement of fair dealing on the part of such
stockholders, "whether or not it be sound in theory," 19 thus
apparently recognizing the inherent difficulty of justifying any
fiduciary relationship between a stockholder and his corporation.
The second of the suggested propositions mentioned at the
outset would require the management stockholders "to ref-abij
from acting in any situation In which thiy lvc an intercst
apart from that of the corporation." This rule would, of course,
bring the holders of management stock under the absolute dis-
ability which only a few jurisdictions impose upon directors,
viz., that of an agent dealing with himself-a result which, as
shown above, is wholly inapplicable to the fact situation of
management stock, since management stockholders are not
agents of the corporation. Further, tis rule goes far beyond
the ordinary rule of a fiduciary's responsibilities in dealing with
his cestui in matters outside of the scope of the agency or trust.
Far from imposing such an absolute disability upon stockholders
in a position of dominance, many courts have held that even
directors may deal with the corporation,:" may, and often should,
Is Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N. Y. 185, 195, 123 N. E.
148, (1919):
"When a number of stockholders constitute themselves, or are by law
constituted, the managers of corporate affairs or interests, they stand in
much the same attitude towards the other or minority stockholders that
the directors sustain, generally, towards all the stockholders, and the law
requires of them the utmost good faith."
To similar effect see MIAcHEN, op. cit. sztpra note 2, § 1007:
"Where one class of shareholders has no vote or voice in the corporate
management, there is the stronger reason for holding that the other share-
holders stand in fiduciary relation toward them."
Also Williams, Responsibility of Corporate Control (1926) 12 VA. L.
REv. 563.
1- MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1306.
20 Cowell v. McMillin, 177 Fed. 25 (C. C. A. 9th, 1910). In this case
the defendant, president and majority stockholder, bought a patented bar-
rel-making machine and contracted with his corporation for the sale of its
produce. The court held that as the contract was fair and entered into
for the corporation by a disinterested majority it could not be avoidcd.
The point was also made in the case that at the time of renewals of the
contract the majority of the directors held but one share of stock each,
having sold all the rest of their stock to McMillin. The court held that
this did not make them dummies of his, however; that the management was
still with them, although they were selected by him.
Mlo Aw=z, op. cit. supra note 12, § 52S; FLErcHim, op. cit. supra note 14,
at 3525.
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assist it in refinancing, 21 and that corporations controlled by the
same stockholders may deal with each other except in the case
where the presence of a majority of interested directors on the
board of each corporation subjects them to the technical dis-
ability of an agent dealing with himself.22
The dangers attendant upon separation of control from equi-
table ownership can be guarded against without creating any
such severe rule of fiduciary relationship as that suggested.
Equity will not permit the powers held by management stock-
holders to be used as instruments of fraud or unfair dealing.
If, through identity of interests between management stock-
holders and directors, or through the actual domination or con-
trol of directors by management stockholders, the latter become
in fact the managing agents of the corporation, then admittedly
they may not deal with the corporation without subjecting
2- Sanford Tool Co. v. Howe, Brown & Co., 157 U. S. 312, 15 Sup. Ct.
621 (1894) (the stockholders authorized the extension of a mortgage to.
its directors to secure present and future advances. The Court upheld
their enforcement of the mortgage as against creditors); Minn, Loan &
Trust Co. v. Peteler Car Co., 132 Minn. 277, 156 N. WV. 255 (1916)
(mortgage to majority directors was upheld); Schnittger v. Old Home &
Miim Co., 144 Cal. 603, 78 Pac. 9 (1904); New Memphis Gas Lt. Co.
Cases, 105 Tenn. 268, 60 S. W. 206 (1900); Irving Bank Columbia Trust
Co. v. Stoddard et al., 292 Fed. 815 (C. C. A. 1st, 1923) (the plaintiff
bank creditor nominated three of the five directors of the corporation and
now sues to uphold agreements made with the corporation regarding sub-
sequent financing. The court upheld these agreements as fair).
22 U. S. Rolling Stock Co. v. R. R., 34 Ohio St. 450 (1878) (this case
concerned the right to avoid a contract between two corporations having
five common directors, entered into by one of them at a meeting of the direc-
tors attended by eight of its thirteen directors, two of the eight being also
directors in the other corporation. The court held the contract could not
be avoided); Aldine Mfg. Co. v. Phillips, 129 Mich. 240, 88 N. W. 632
(1902); Int. Stevedoring Co. v. Frank Waterhouse & Co., supra note 16
(attempt was made by the trustee in bankruptcy of the defendant company
to avoid the foreclosure of a pledge by the latter to the plaintiff company,
on the ground of F. W.'s adverse interest in the pledgee corporation. The
court held that the pledge was not void solely on the ground of the inter-
locking directorate and that although the personal interest of F. W. and
possibly his son were actually adverse, still the interests of the other
common directors elected by them were not necessarily so and the contract
would stand); Farmers' State Bank v. Haun, 30 Wyo. 322, 222 Pac. 45
(1924); 7 R. C. L. § 461; FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 14, 3610, 3634-5,
3641; MORAWETZ, op. cit. supra note 12, § 530. Some cases uphold the con-
tract, if fair, even where there was a majority of common directors on each
side. Hill v. Gould, 129 Mo. 106 (1895) ; Teller v. Tonopah & G. R. R., 155
Fed. 482 (E. D. Pa. 1907); South Side Trust Co. v. Washington Tin Plate
Co., 122 Kan. 469, 252 Pac. 237 '(1916); Leavenworth v. Chicago & R. R.
Co., 134 U. S. 688, 10 Sup. Ct. 708 (1889); of. Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica
G. & El. Co., 224 N. Y. 483, 121 N. E. 378 (1918) (avoiding contract be-
tween two corporations found unfairly induced by one dominating common
director).
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themselves to, the same responsibilities and disabilities to which
directors are subject.23 These responsibilities and disabilities
arise, however, not by reason of the fact that they are manage-
ment stockholders, but because of the identity between the direc-
tors and the management stockholders in such case.
The mere fact that the directors are elected by the manage-
ment stockholders does not, however, in itself make them dum-
mies.2 4  Nor does it make the management stockholders direc-
tors. In this respect, the holders of management stock cannot
be logically distinguished from two or three individual majority
stockholders, or from the small percentage of minority stock-
holders actually in control of every large corporation whose
stock is widely distributed. Still less can the holders of such
stock be distinguished from voting trustees. The disparity of
actual interests in the corporate assets between the management
stockholders and the other stockholders is certainly no greater
than that between voting trustees and the holders of voting
trust certificates. Yet the right of such majority stockholders,
such minority stockholders, and such voting trustees, -5 to deal
with the corporation seems not to have been seriously questioned.
The propriety and usefulness of voting trusts have become
generally recognized. Since before the time of Professor Bald-
win's article, referred to at the outset, the voting trust has been
the orthodox means of insuring control over the management
of a corporation, particularly in cases where the corporation
has been in financial difficulties and the persons furnishing new
money to it are justifiably insistent upon being assured that its
affairs will be handled by men whom they know to be capable."G
In the lists of voting trustees acting under the voting trusts
of stocks of numerous railroads and other large corporations,
there are often found representatives of the banldng houses
who sponsored the sale of the securities of such corporations
to the public, and who continue to handle the financing of such
railroads or other corporations, while their representatives
serve as voting trustees.2 7  There has been no suggestion that
voting trustees may not deal with the corporation, and indeed
the application of any such doctrine to voting trusts would be
seriously disturbing to the financial position of corporations
whose stocks are today held ander such voting trusts.
Yet no closer analogy to management stockholders can be
23 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 6783, and cases there cited; 7
R. C. L. § 461.
24 Svpra note 15.
25 CUSHING, VOTING TRUSTS (1915) 28, 32, 56.
26 Ibid. 24.
27Ibid. 45, 56, and see the voting trustees named in the forms of Voting
Trust Agreements given, ibid. 148, et scq.
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found than that of voting trustees. The duties of both are very'
similar-"the practical tendency has been to confine the func-
tions of the voting trustees to the choice of a board of directors,
the receipt of dividends and the distribution of amounts so re-
ceived, and the discretionary power of terminating the trust" "O
-the chief distinction being that management stockholders are
not troubled with the collection and distribution of dividends,,
and that the duration of their stock is fixed in the charter. The
principal complaints directed now against management stock
are likewise very similar to those which were originally directed
against voting trusts, viz., that individual stockholders are
deprived of the benefit of the deliberation and judgment of their
fellow stockholders in the annual election of directors, that con-
trol is centered in a small group without any real financial
interest in the corporation, and usually with ulterior motives
to serve, and finally, that the voting power is separated from
the beneficial ownership of the stock and of the corporation.2
The result aimed at by both voting trusts and management stock
is the same. Continuity and efficiency of management of the
corporation are demanded by some group of individuals or
interests, usually as security for money loaned, and are conceded.
by the corporation and its stockholders.
With regard to voting trusts one writer has said: all
" * * * necessarily it was found that there must be cases in
which voting trusts should be allowed ': * 2-* for example,
where money is borrowed and a voting trust is created to
continue until the loan is paid. No court has ever condemned
such a voting trust and it is safe to suppose that such a trust
will never be condemned. Economic necessity in such in-
stance is too clear. Many a corporation in urgent need of
funds has found itself where it could not borrow the money
which it was compelled to have unless the voting power over
its stock and the corresponding control over its affairs were
placed in the hands of the lender or a person designated
by the lender, to continue there so long as the loan was out-
standing."
The contract made by stockholders in the certificate of incor-
poration providing for management stock under legislative sanc-
tion should not be of less dignity or less binding force than the
contract among stockholders setting up a voting trust. It may,
of course, be objected that the latter is limited in duration,
either by practice or by statute, whereas management stock is
28 Ibid. 14.
29 Ibid 103 et s'eq.; Finkelstein, Voting Thist Agreements (1926) 24
MicH. L. REv. 344.
3o larion Smith, Limitations on the Validity of Voting Trusts (1922) 22
COL. L. Rav. 627, 630; CUSHiNG, op. cit. supra note 25, at 107.
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by statute unlimited in duration. This objection, however, fails
in cases where the life of the management stock is limited to
a particular time, as is likely to be the case where the manage-
ment stock is issued as part of a plan of reorganization to insure
continuity and efficiency of management during the fife of the
securities issued upon the reorganization.
The fact that large corporations with widely scattered stocks
are usually controlled by a very small minority of stockholders,
and the ease with which such minority control has been obtained,
has been the subject of considerable comment21 This ver., ease
of minority control, with its resultant dangers not only to the
holders of bonds and notes of the corporation, but also to the
other stockholders, is a strong inducement to those undertaking
any considerable corporate financing to insure against the dis-
astrous consequences of a selfish exercise of such minority con-
trol, by the issuance of management shares or otherwise.m 2
Especially is this true in the case of investment banking houses
who recognize their obligation to the public purchasing the
securities distributed by them. The following comment illus-
trates the bankers' position in this connection: 93
"The reviving of a helpless concern is usually, and natur-
ally, entrusted to a banking firm or a group of bankers.
They or their friends are expected in the end to market
the securities of the reorganized company and they are
entitled to take all proper steps both for protecting their
customers and for insuring correct management of a com-
pany of which they are regarded as financial sponsors.* : :
Their possible profits in controlling future underwritings
are negligible as compared with the effect on their business
of having incompletely managed a futile reorganization."
31In the February, 1926, issue of "The Index," published by the New
York Trust Company, attention is called to this case of minority control
(p. 3):
" * * * with a dozen owners, probably 511, will be necessary for domi-
nance. With 300,000 scattered holdings, a possible 15 or 20 of the votes
can never be overmatched at an election.'
In BRoOKINGS, INDUSTRIAL OWNERSHIP-ITS ECONOMIC N SOCLIL SIG-
NIFICANCE (1925) 9, attention is called to the same fact and quotation is
made from the letter of the president of a large national corporation to
the effect that out of 8069 stockholders over 90V own less than 100 shares
and the directors and their friends and relatives own and control lezs
than 10%. CUSHING, op. cit. S&upra note 25, at 14 et scq; Baldwin, Voting
Trusts (1891) 1 YALE LAW JoURnAL 1.
32 MORAWETZ, op. cit. supra note 12, at 495:
"Not infrequently, persons who agree to advance money to a corpora-
tion expressly stipulate for a voice in the board of directorz, Eo that they
may be able to supervise the faithful application of the money advanced
and can watch for their own security."
Irving Bank Columbia Tr. Co. v. Stoddard, supra note 21.
-- CUSHING, op. cit. supra note 25, at 27; see also supra note 6.
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No one has ever questioned the right of majority stockholders,
minority stockholders or voting trustees to purchase the securi-
ties of their respective corporations, both directly and from
third parties, to resell such securities to the corporation at a
fair profit, and generally to deal with the corporation, so long
as there is not an identity of interests with, or actual domina-
tion of, the majority of the board of directors.3 4 It is frequently
stated that a director must not profit at the expense of his cor-
poration, and that if he does, he may be made to account to the
corporation for such profit. This general statement is not
strictly true even in the case of a director,5 and a fortiori can-
not be true in the case of a management stockholder. Professor
Warren states: 36
"There is no rule that a director may never purchase from
third persons the obligations of the corporation for his own
account, but he must not compete with the corporation in
the purchase of its obligations."
It is bnly when the individual director infringes the forego-
ing rule of not competing with the corporation that he may be
compelled to account to his corporation upon a later sale to it.
In accordance with the rules underlying fiduciary relationships
as stated by Machen,37 where the person in a fiduciary relation
sells to his cestui, in a transaction not within the limits of the
agency or trust (or in the case of a director, where the corpora-
tion is adequately represented by other directors), he owes that
cestui only the duty of fair dealing.38 The price which the
fiduciary may have paid for the property in question is immater-
ial, and in only the few cases where the director or the fiduciary
in question may be said to have purchased the property on behalf
34 Supra notes 19, 20, 21.
35 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 3507 et seq., discussing the theo-
retical difficulties of holding a director to the responsibilities of a trustee.
36 (1921) 34 H~av. L. REv. 282, 296.
37 Supra note 13.3 8 Howland v. Corn, 232 Fed. 35, 43 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).. It was held
in this case that the receiver could not require an accounting from three
of the five directors of a bankrupt corporation for their profits on sales
of property to the corporation so long as made fairly (one of the three
directors owned one piece so sold and the two others were majority stock-
holders in the corporation selling the second); Hannerty v. The Standard
Theatre Co., 109 Mo. 297, 19 S. W. 82 (1891).
FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 14, § 2304:
"If a director or other officer, purchases property, being at the
time under no duty to purchase for the corporation, he may afterwards
sell it to the corporation, if it is represented by other officers, without
disclosing what he paid for it, and if there is no fraud, he will not be
compelled to account for the profit he may make in the transaction."
MoRAwETz, op. cit. s9upra note 12, §.521; (1913) 13 COL. L. REv. 432.
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of the corporation or cestui can the latter require the fiduciary
to account to it for any profits2' This point is well brought
out by Mr. Kenneth V. Riley: 41
"It is everywhere agreed that a director occupies a fiduci-
ary relation to his corporation. But although the courts
and writers speak of the director as a trustee for his cor-
poration and for the body of stockholders, they are not in
accord as to the extent of the trusteeship or of the duty
this imposes upon him with respect to transactions where
his individual interests may rival the interests of this cor-
poration. It was contended in the recent Illinois case that
the mere fact that an investment would be beneficial to the
corporation, the corporation being in a position to take ad-
vantage of it, raises a duty in the director to offer it to his
company before taking it for himself. Statements in text-
books and dicta of judges appear to support this contention,
but the cases therein cited do not bear them out. For in each
of the cases cited there was not only an investment which
would have been to the interests of the corporation, but the
corporation, by its nature or otherwise, had been actually
committed to the investment, to the director's knowledge,
so that he was under a specific duty to procure it for his
corporation or at least to give it the first opportunity to
make the investment."
The same distinction is made by the Massachusetts Court in
the case of Parker v. Nickerson: 4
"But if he did not originally buy the coal for the purpose
of selling it to the Company, and did not buy it at a time
when it was his duty as treasurer to buy coal for the Com-
pany, it is difficult to see how he can be treated as the agent
of the Company in making the original purchase. If the
defendant rightfully bought the coal on his own account and
then subsequently, as agent of the company, bought the
coal from himself, the contract could undoubtedly be re-
scinded by the company if it could restore the coal, and if
it could not, the company would not be bound to pay the
price fixed by the defendant but only bound to pay what
was a reasonable price at the time; but this is ,ery diffcrcnt
from holding tlwh it is only bozn zd to pay what the dcfcad-
ant paid for it some montzhs before."
The non-disclosure of the fiduciary's interest may give the cor-
poration dealing with him the right to rescind, but such rescis-
sion having become impossible, the recovery to be had by the
corporation is not all profits made by the fiduciary but only
39 FIETCHER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 3524.
40 (1920) 4 MINN. L. REV. 513.
4-137 Mass. 487, 497 (1884).
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the difference between the price paid by the corporation and
the fair value at the time of the purchase by it.4
The foregoing authorities show that, even if we admit an
extraordinary duty, even that of a director upon the manage-
ment stockholder, the only limitation which would be placed
upon transactions between him and his corporation would be
42Supra note 34; Burland v. Earle, [1902] A. C. 83, 94, 98; In Re Cape
Breton Co., 29 Ch. Div. 795, 805 (1885); see Zeckendorf v. Steinfield, 12
Ariz. 245, 261, 100 Pac. 784, 790 (1909):
"The law is that one may not purchase and hold, as his owil, property
which he is in duty bound to purchase and hold for another. "' * *
This rule applies to officers and directors of a corporation, as to other
persons sustaining fiduciary relations to others. . Whether in any case an
officer of a corporation is in duty bound to purchase property for the
corporation or to refrain from purchasing property for himself, depends
upon whether the corporation has an interest, actual or in expectancy, in
the property or whether the purchase of the property by the officer or
director may hinder and defeat the plans and purposes of the corporation
in the carrying on or development of the legitimate business for which
it was created * * *. We think the rule as thus stated is as broad
as the authorities will sustain."
Supra note 19; Board of Com. of Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds, 44
Ind. 509 (1873); Highland Park Inv. Co. v. List, 27 Cal. App. '761, 161
Pac. 162 (1915). Machen states this refusal of equity in such a case to
compel an accounting by the directors or trustee to be an arbitrary excep-
tion in England. See MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1609. The
principles underlying the rule would appear to be correct, however, and
the foregoing and numerous other cases would bear out the distinction
here contended for. Cf. Redhead v. Parkway Driving Club, 148 N. Y.
471, 42 N. E. 1047 (1896); Nat. Mfrs Co. v. Bird, 97 N. J. Eq. 242, 127
Atl. 819 (1925) (in each case the defendant directors were required to
account for breach of an express duty to buy or sell as agents of the
corporation). The same distinction is made in Harts v. Brown, 77 Ill.
226 (1875) (the directors there bought up the bonds of the corporation
and foreclosed the mortgage. The court required them to account to the
complaining stockholders only for the sale of corporation property in
excess of that required to pay the amount due on the bonds, for in the
sale of such excess they themselves sold as agents of the corporation and
must account). Cases allowing directors to purchase corporate securities
and claims from third persons at a discount and to enforce them at the
face amount, would seem to go on much the same grounds. See Camden Safe
Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Citizens Cold Storage Co., 69 N. J. Eq. '718, 61 Atl. 629
(1905) . Inglehart v. Hotel Company, 32 Hun 377, 383 (N. Y. 1884);
Seymour v. S. F. C. Ass'n, 144 N. Y. 333, 39 N. E. 365 (1895), (particu-
larly at 342 et seq., 39 N. E. at 366,et seq., at which Finch, J., clearly ex-
presses the above distinction) ; Forest & Co. v. Gade, 55 Ill. App. 181, 197
(1894).
From these cases it would seem that if at the time of the alleged
trustee's purchase in question he was delegated to purchase on behalf of
the corporation or the property was essential to its business, or the securi-
ties or claims purchased were past due, he then must account to it for
any profits made to him from the resale to the corporation. Otherwise
he can only be compelled to account to the corporation for the difference
between the fair value at the time of re-sale and the price paid by the
corporation.
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the duty of fair dealing. There is no support for the conten-
tion that he cannot deal with the corporation or that, if he does,
he must account for all profits derived therefrom.
One of the most serious practical effects of an absolute dis-
ability on the part of the management stockholders to deal with
the corporation would be to prevent investment bankers hold-
ing management stock, created in the interest of the investing
public, from handling new financing of the corporation in ques-
tion or from aiding in any way in its financial affairs. The
necessity to every large corporation of continuously securing
new capital, and the desirability of its having a definitely estab-
lished banking house connection, are everywhere recognized. It
is obvious that under these circumstances, if the bankers of such
corporation cannot deal with it because of their ownership of
its management stock (and in all too many instances control
of the corporation by the bankers has been necessitated as a
safeguard against the repetition of previous financial reverses) ,1
43 See the numerous instances cited in Cushing, op. cit. supra note 25, at
78, et seq. An interesting example of the financial difficulties of a large
corporation is found in the Westinghouse reorganizations detailed in
DEWING, CORPORATE PROIOTIONS AND REoRGANIZATIois, (1914) 197; 193:
"Both followed crises in the company's history, resulting directly from
a too rapid investment of capital in fixed asscts and indirectly from an
unconservative business policy. At both times, the financial stability of
the company was wrecked through its lack of working capital. The busi-
ness was never an economic failure in the sense that it did not earn
adequate interest and profits. On the contrary, the earnings were abnor-
mally great and the dividend disbursements, in the periods immediately
before, disproportionately high. The methods employed to secure relief
were identical in the two cases also. * * * The positive expedients were
the same; the merchandise creditors and bankers funded their debts into
stock. * * *
"It is only fair to those who successfully brought the Westinghouse Com-
pany through the crises of 1907 to outline briefly the result of their policy.
When the receivers were discharged in the autumn of 1903, a new man-
agement assumed the control of the company, for the merchandise credi-
tors and the bankers had been unwilling to make the sacrifice which the
reorganization involved, unless they were assured that the errors in finan-
cial judgment and the recklessness in the declaration of dividends which
had brought disaster to the Westinghouse Company were not to be re-
peated in the future. They took the management of the Company out of
the hands of its former stockholders, undertook to administer it themselves
on the basis of a greater conservatism. A new board of directors was
chosen, consisting of 16 men who had been prominent during the receiver-
ship of the company. Its members were selected from among the bankers',
the merchandise creditors' and the stockholders' committee-, and their
representatives."
See also Kidd v. Traction Co., 74 N. H. 160, 66 Atl. 127 (1907), and Win-
sor v. Commonwealth Coal Co., 63 Wash. 62, 114 Pac. 908 (1911), in both
of which cases the persons loaning the moneys stipulated for control of the
corporations. In the former case the bankers in agreeing to the financ-
ing required by the defendant corporation stipulated for the election by
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the corporation would be cut off from the very people who are
best acquainted with its needs and resources, most interested
in its welfare and most likely to accord it advantageous terms.4
Before any reputable investment bankers will undertake any
extensive financing of a corporation, the corporation is subjected
to a careful examination from every angle.4 r Legalities are
carefully investigated; titles are searched; and complete audits
are made. Must the corporation, each time it issues securities,
be required to seek new bankers and again bear the very con-
siderable expense of new appraisals, new investigations, new
audits? 46
It is obvious that the suggestion that management stock-
holders must refrain from acting in any cases where they are
interested attaches to such stockholders disabilities far more
onerous than those applicable to persons admittedly in a fidu-
ciary relation to a corporation.4 7 No such disability would
attach to an individual majority or minority stockholder in con-
trol, or to voting trustees or even to an individual director. 6
them of three of the five directors on its board, and the actual contract
was not executed or performed until sometime after these three members
had assumed office. The appellate court stated in the first case:
"The control (by the bankers) which the Court made use of in apply%-
ing the doctrine of constructive fraud to the case, resulted from the con-
tract; the contract did not arise from the control."
4 4 MORAWETZ, op. cit. supra note 12, at 495; Irving Bank Columbia Trust
Co. v. Stoddard, supra note 21; Warren v. Pim, supra note 10 (Swaze,
J., commenting on frequent desirability of continuity of management as
security); Hill v. Walville Lumber Co., 114 Wash. 476, 195 Pac. 249 (1921) ;
COOK, CoRPORATIoNs, (8th ed. 1923) 2198; FLETCHER, Op. Cit. supra note 14,
at 3603, quoting Justice Miller in Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S.
587, 589 (1875), as follows:
"While it is true that the defendant, as a director of the corporation,
was bound by all those rules of conscientious fairness which courts of
equity have imposed as the guides for dealing in such cases, it cannot be
maintained that any rule forbids one director among several from loan-
ing money to the corporation when the money is needed, and the trans-
action is open, and otherwise free from blame. No adjudged case has
gone so far as this. Such a doctrine, while it would afford little pro-
tection to the corporation against actual fraud or oppression, would de-
prive it of the aid of those most interested in giving aid judiciously, and
best qualified to judge the necessity of that aid, and of the extent to
which it may safely be given."
45 See Masslich, op. cit. supra note 6. To the same effect see Isaacs, op.
cit. supra note 7, at 208.4 M r. Masslich in his article, supra note 6, mentions the complaint on
the part of small corporations of their inability to afford these expenses
and consequently their inability to interest investment bankers.
47 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 3553, 3602-3.
48Ibid. 3602-3; Stuart v. Larson, 298 Fed. 223, 225 (C. C. A. 8th,
1924) ; see also Cook, Fraud and Ultra Vires in Reorganization (1924)
10 A. B. A. J. 780, 785. There is authority for the proposition that
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If the management stock can be shown to be actually in con-
trol, if the directors are actually dummies, certainly the trans-
action should be subject to the most searching scrutiny. Further
than this, neither logic nor principles of equity would seem to
require any such rule.
As for the third suggested proposition-that the management
stockholders should be held jointly liable with the directors for
mismanagement-it is submitted that in accordance with the
principles stated herein the management stockholders would
of course be jointly liable for the mismanagement in any case
in which it could be shown that they had been jointly respon-
sible, 9 as in the case of other joint tortfeasors, but not other-
wise. In the absence of a showing of conspiracy or election of
incompetent directors by voting trustees or by individual major-
ity or minority stockholders of the corporation, no one would
consider charging them with such joint liability purely because
of their selection of the directors. The control over directors
exercised by management stockholders is no greater in theory
or in practice than that exercised by these others with power to
elect all or a majority of the board." Bankers as such, and as
owners of management stock, should not be subject to a liability
so much greater than that of others in analogous positions.
To summarize, the legality of the creation of management
stock does not appear to be questioned. The creation of non-
voting stocks has long been expressly authorized.5 Consequently
the distinctions stated herein between the holders of such stock
and directors must be conceded, and in the absence of a showing
in each case of an actual situation destroying this distinction,
it must stand.52 As shown above, the fact situation underlying,
and emphasized as distinguishing, management stock is not sub-
stantially different from the fact situation underlying voting
trusts, and the adverse comments directed against management
stock are strikingly similar to those once directed against vot-
this disability would not even attach to a majority of the directors.
FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 3610.
- Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 5upra note 18.50 MoRAwmz, op. cit. supra note 12, § 475:
"If the charter of a corporation provides that particular agents shall
exercise certain powers, or do certain acts, the majority have no right
to interfere with such agents in the exercise of the powers entrusted to
them; and it is immaterial that such agents were appointed by the ma-jority, and that the majority have authority to appoint their succeszors.
Under these circumstances, the majority can exercise merely an appoint-
ing power, and control the management of the company's business by the
election of such officers as will carry out their duties."
And see supra notes 16, 20.
51 Supra note 1.
52 Supra notes 14, 16, 20, 46, 50.
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ing trusts. It is safe to say, therefore, that in the same way
that the attitude toward voting trusts has gradually changed
and their usefulness has become generally recognized, it is prob-
able that as the true nature of management stock is more
studied and appreciated, any initial hostility will wane. The
general principles of equity will be found a sufficient safeguard,
without the invocation of new rules of disability which, in their
application, would be highly impracticable and unfair, as well
as prejudicial to the best interests of the corporation and its
stockholders.
